Deconstructing Marxism Part 2: The Messy Meta-Ethics of Marxism
“What embitters the world is not excess of criticism but
absence of self-criticism.” – G. K. Chesterton
Deconstruction
As I understand it, oppression is one of the central concerns, or perhaps the central concern of Marxism, so this is what I now proceed to deconstruct. I will do so by examining the meaning of the word itself and the meanings of the words that emerge in the process. The next paragraph is made up of many definitions, and some word analyses, and can even feel like a wild-goose chase, so feel free to skim or simply skip it.
Instead of depending solely on my own interpretation(s), I decided to examine dictionary definitions of the relevant terms as well as ask a few of my friends about how they understood the word ‘oppression’. Starting with dictionary definitions, Merriam-Webster (n.d.) defines ‘oppression’ as an “unjust or cruel exercise of authority or power” (Definition 1a). ‘Unjust’ is defined as “characterized by injustice” (Definition 1) which is… amazingly helpful…but then this is to be expected, since Derrida warned us that the meanings/definitions of words would only be made up of more words, and so on and so forth. All the same, I think a little more digging could help us make some kind of progress. ‘Injustice’ refers to an “absence of justice: violation of right or of the rights of another” (Definition 1) and “unfairness” is listed as a synonym, while “unfair” was listed as a synonym for ‘unjust’. At this point, I thought I should also look into ‘equal’ and ‘equity’ since inequality and inequity are often considered synonymous with, and/or very relevant to, ‘oppression’, and their respective (and most relevant) definitions are “like for each member of a group, class, or society” (Definition 1c) and “justice according to natural law or right; specifically: freedom from bias or favoritism” (Definition 1a). At least one prominent theme/term noticeable thus far is ‘justice’, two of whose definitions are “the quality of being just, impartial, or fair” (Definition 2a) and “conformity to truth, fact, or reason” (Definition 3). This latter definition of ‘justice’ I found quite interesting, especially because it is almost identical to one definition of ‘just’ (Definition 1a). The last definition of this dreary paragraph (yay!) is also of ‘just’, and it is “conforming to a standard of correctness” (Definition 1b). All of this correlates quite well, I think, with the meanings/definitions my friends offered, which roughly included: subjugation of minorities, injustice, violation of human rights, and misuse of power.
From all of this ‘research’, and for the sake of this essay I will consider ‘oppression’ as comprising the following elements: (1) lack of justice, i.e. injustice, (2) discrimination, or lack of fair treatment, or violation(s) of rights, i.e. inequality, and (3) relevance to, or violation of, some sort of natural/given standard of correctness or fact or reason, i.e. incorrectness. As far as I have researched, Marx himself never really comprehensively (or at all?) described his idea of justice, so I will examine each of the three elements in the theories of justice/ethics advanced by Nancy Fraser and John Rawls.
Injustice
Fraser (1998) conceptualizes injustice as occurring on the dimensions of both economics and culture, and therefore describes the two aspects of ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ to achieve a state of justice in society, in order to emphasize that justice must address the economic structure and material resources, as well as status and institutionalized patterns of cultural value. This is pretty neat as far as most theories go, and she also mentioned that the purpose of redistribution and recognition, which is also the core of her conception of justice, is to achieve the norm of “parity of participation” according to which “justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers” (Fraser, 1998). In other words, the main point is to ensure an ‘equal footing’ between members of society, which must be achieved in terms of economics/resources as well as culture/status, and this is what constitutes justice. However, she specified that the moral requirement of a society according to her theory is the possibility of an equal footing, rather than everyone actually participating in social activities on an equal footing, and she also admitted that the questions of what would constitute the required ‘parity of participation’ and what degree of equality would ensure it, are open. This creates quite a bit of ambiguity in the theory right at its most practical point but, regarding the element of (in)justice, her theory is relatively clear and hinges on the norm of equal participation.
One of the articles that Rawls’ wrote was titled “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, and rightly so, because theories or ideas pertaining to the latter would, according to me, fit more with the third element of ‘oppression’ that I’ve described above (as I will explain below). Anyway, for now I will only pick out what is probably the central concept of Rawls’ theory of justice, and which most modern Marxists would probably agree with1: the veil of ignorance2 (Wenar, 2021). This concept is part of Rawls’ thought experiment called the “original position” where he wanted to comprehensively conceptualize a just and fair society. This included trying to formulate a method of socio-political decision-making by which information that is arbitrary or irrelevant to such decisions—such as a citizen’s race, age, beliefs or economic status—is kept aside. This is in order to ensure that these decisions are made keeping in mind the status of even the most disadvantaged, so that the (political) framework for a just and fair society can be outlined. On the face of it, it appears quite sensible, and even sensitive to the experiences of the oppressed, but I consider this a pretty flawed idea overall, because there’s at least one concrete instance I can think of, in which even this simple-looking and sensitive-appearing idea would be quite difficult (if not impossible) to reach consensus on, and that is the topic of abortion.
There are surely many marginalized groups in any society, but the most marginalized are quite obviously children because of their needs, physical and mental vulnerabilities, etc.,3 and the smallest children are the most marginalized of all, i.e. the unborn. While Rawl attempts to avoid controversial topics, this topic is inherently…pretty controversial. It is extremely sticky, starts with several questions and has comparatively few answers. When does life begin? When does human life begin? When does personhood begin? What is a ‘person’? These are obviously quite crucial issues in deciding the permissibility of abortion and what point human rights are applicable from, and specifically with respect to Rawls, let me throw this in for good measure: from what point does one acquire the status of citizenship (and thereby the related rights)? If policy-making is to proceed keeping in mind ‘the most disadvantaged’, it probably can’t proceed much (if policies are to be comprehensively just and fair) without resolving these issues. For example, Jacobs (2018) conducted a survey in which several Americans were asked how important the question “When does a human’s life begin?” is in the abortion debate, and which group of people is most competent/ideal for answering it. A majority of the participants (more than 80% for both issues) rated it to be an important question, and that biologists would be most qualified to answer it. Although this seems to reek of WEIRDness (since the researcher as well as sample consisted of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic persons; Shulevitz, 2020), I feel the assessment is a reasonable one, since modern scientific methods are capable of weighing in, at least on this matter if no other, with a sufficiently objective perspective (unless there is reason to believe that in this issue, there are differences across cultures or regions). In the latter part of his study, Jacobs (2018) surveyed biologists, variously assessing whether or not they thought that life begins at fertilization, and a majority (at all times, more than two-thirds) affirmed that it does. Condic (2009, 2013) has emphatically argued that the cell resulting from sperm-egg fusion, i.e. a zygote, is not merely a ‘part’ of a human or merely a ‘human cell’. According to her, the biological evidence, drawn from objective observations and using stringent scientific criteria regarding what constitutes a cell, a new type of cell, and an organism, leads to the conclusion that human life begins at fertilization.
And yet, keeping all this information in mind, the words of Jacobs (2018) are also of great relevance when he said that the mere scientific description that fetuses are human beings “does not dictate normative views on whether a fetus has rights, whether a fetus’ possible rights outweigh a woman’s reproductive rights, or whether a fetus deserves legal protection.” In his own survey, there were several biologists who affirmed the beginning of life at fertilization, while also holding pro-choice views on the issue of abortion, and this is perfectly rational because both of these views do not necessarily entail a contradiction of any sort. There are several more relevant issues than simply when human life begins, such as whether a fetus qualifies as a human person, whether a fetus can feel pain, whether either of these or some other criteria constitute substantially relevant criteria as regards the permissibility of abortion, etc. In any case, if simply getting started with the definition of what constitutes a ‘human’ and a ‘person’ and a ‘citizen’ lands us in such deep dilemmas and debates, then framing a coherent, defensible conceptualization of (socio-political) ‘justice’ (using Rawls’ methodology) seems nearly unimaginable (in which case, the idea of ‘injustice’ is also rendered meaningless). From there, going on to form ‘just’ socio-political policies, and actually implementing them, appears to be just on the verge of impossibility.
Inequality
Whereas Rawls’ theory was stickier and more problematic with respect to the first element of injustice, Fraser’s is stickier with respect to the second one, of inequality. Of course, Rawls’ theory is also relevant here, since it was, after all, a theory of Justice as Fairness, and he built his framework on the three political ideals of freedom, equality and fairness (Wenar, 2021), and (lack of) fairness is more or less what is meant by the second element. I think the same criticisms that apply to Fraser here also apply to Rawls.
As mentioned, the core of Fraser’s (1998) theory is pretty much centered on equality of participation in the activities and institutions of society, or more specifically, the possibility of equality in social interaction, which could perhaps also be interpreted as equality of opportunity. This makes intuitive sense, but how can one measure or verify that there is an equal possibility of people participating in social activities? She cited the example of France (which she did not wholly agree with) where ‘parity of participation’ was taken to mean a strict 50–50 participation of men and women in the legislature, which seems much more practicable and easily verifiable than only the possibility, but not reality, of something similar. The bigger flaw, however, is in the whole definition and concept of ‘equality’ itself.
When Rawls and Fraser are considering the economic side of things, it is far easier to agree with them because material resources can be quantitatively measured. It makes sense to say, “This family has 10kg of rice and that family has 1000kg of rice, and this is inequality,” or “That man owns 500 acres of land and this woman owns half an acre, and this is inequality.” Differences in strictly quantitative terms can certainly be called ‘inequality’. The issue becomes a foggy mess when discussing rights and culture and status and status injuries, because these are hardly quantifiable, much less measurable. The question in this situation is, what exactly is inequality? What exactly is being referred to when people describe either equality or inequality? To address this, I must move to the third element, but let me end this section with this very important passage:
Obviously, it will not do to take our ideal from the principle in nature; for the simple reason that (except for some human or divine theory), there is no principle in nature. [emphasis added] For instance, the cheap anti-democrat of to-day will tell you solemnly that there is no equality in nature. He is right, but he does not see the logical addendum. There is no equality in nature; also there is no inequality in nature. Inequality, as much as equality, implies a standard of value. [emphasis added] To read aristocracy into the anarchy of animals is just as sentimental as to read democracy into it. Both aristocracy and democracy are human ideals: the one saying that all men are valuable, the other that some men are more valuable. But nature does not say that cats are more valuable than mice; nature makes no remark on the subject. She does not even say that the cat is enviable or the mouse pitiable. We think the cat superior because we have (or most of us have) a particular philosophy to the effect that life is better than death. But if the mouse were a German pessimist mouse, he might not think that the cat had beaten him at all. He might think he had beaten the cat by getting to the grave first. Or he might feel that he had actually inflicted frightful punishment on the cat by keeping him alive. Just as a microbe might feel proud of spreading a pestilence, so the pessimistic mouse might exult to think that he was renewing in the cat the torture of conscious existence. It all depends on the philosophy of the mouse. You cannot even say that there is victory or superiority in nature unless you have some doctrine about what things are superior. [emphasis added] You cannot even say that the cat scores unless there is a system of scoring. You cannot even say that the cat gets the best of it unless there is some best to be got. (Chesterton, 1908/2005, Chapter 7)
Incorrectness
Before I get started, let me take a small explanatory detour. If you’re aware of the is–ought problem or the fact–value distinction, you can skip this paragraph. I can say, or think, or assume, that I am surrounded by air, or that you, dear reader, understand English, or that the Earth revolves around the Sun. Simply thinking about these statements does not make them true, but it also does not mean they’re not true: they can be verified. Some ideas are pretty easy to verify, like feeling the air around me, or breathing it, or observing its effects. Others are future contingents, which will require much patience to verify, like this essay being read very much depends on me actually completing it and having it posted (or else I shall remain the sole and sad reader of my own essay) and also on your patience up to this point (thank you). Others require much more effort to verify directly, like using a lot of math, telescopes and effort, etc. to find out that we inhabit a solar system and not a geocentric universe. This much is about merely factual or descriptive statements. The real fun starts with prescriptive statements, i.e. any sort of value claim. For example, take the idea (which Rawls and Fraser probably had in mind somewhere, and many of us, and even you, dear reader, might have) that ‘All humans are equal.’ Equal? In what sense? Numerically equal? Equal in weight? Equal in power? (That’s obviously false, and you can check in with your closest Marxist to know more.)
The statement, of course, is dealing with value, i.e. human worth, by saying that each human being has the same level or amount of worth/dignity as any other, and the exciting part about all value claims is that you can’t really ‘observe and check’ whether they’re true or not—at least not in a like manner as descriptions. It doesn’t matter whether you believe in equality, or think that some humans are greater/better than the others, or that some others ought to die, or whatever else have you; the issue persists—unless, of course, you have some theory of value already, because, as Chesterton (1908/2005) phrased it (so beautifully that I have to quote him again): “…(except for some human or divine theory), there is no principle in nature” (Chapter 7). Justice as a ‘standard of correctness’ that is ‘conforming to fact or reason’ seems to make little sense if we cannot, relying on reason, go from any fact to a standard of correctness: there is no ‘fact’ of justice. It was David Hume, of course, who famously framed the is–ought problem,4 and Lewis (1940) worded it very succinctly when he said, “You can shuffle ‘I want’ and ‘I am forced’ and ‘I shall be well advised’ and ‘I dare not’ as long as you please without getting out of them the slightest hint of ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ ” (Chapter 1).
Rawls was probably aware of this, which would explain why he framed (or rather, constructed) a ‘theory’ of justice, and emphasized that it was ‘not metaphysical’. This definitely does not mean that value claims aren’t rationally justifiable, but only that they are of a (very) different kind from descriptive statements. The tension in the theories of justice/ethics is at its peak with this third element of a ‘standard of correctness’ precisely because the theorists have failed to adequately distinguish between facts and values. Rawls simply (and maybe even arbitrarily) pulled out the three values of freedom, equality and fairness from the “public political culture of a democratic society” (Wenar, 2021) to formulate his theories, but the very descriptions that Fraser (1998) relies on are value-laden, with talk of exclusion and objectification and “the pervasive devaluation and disparagement of things coded as “feminine”.” Of course, one can say, ‘Well, their descriptions are clearly funky, but there is a gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and the quote from Chesterton [above] does say that one can have a human theory of value, so why not accept the prescriptive/normative parts of Fraser’s and Rawls’ theories?’ Fair enough, and this is precisely where Marxism comes in (which, in case you’ve forgotten due to my very long and seemingly irrelevant rant, is supposed to be the main object of this essay).
Before Marxism comes in, though, another tiny detour is required. Some might become a little uneasy on learning about the is–ought problem and it may seem a bit terrifying that no value claims can be easily justified. Throughout human history, however, there have been attempts to bridge the is–ought gap and link together descriptions and prescriptions, whether or not the people trying have done so consciously, and religious belief systems are the best example of this. Take the Brahminical beliefs about caste hierarchies, for instance, and here I’m referring to what is called the ‘conventional view’ that these beliefs are from the Manusmriti, and that they refer to the caste hierarchy originating in the Hindu god Brahma, etc.5 (Chakravorty, 2019). It is assumed that not all humans are equal in worth, so that one who is ‘greater’ or ‘better’ or ‘more pure’ is allowed to ostracize some persons, or is forbidden from touching others. The prescriptions are framed as somehow being logically entailed by the ‘descriptions’ regarding the supernatural, the nature and worth of human beings, etc. (I’m not very well-read in this area, so pardon any errors I might have made.) In the case of the origins of Marxism, too, there wasn’t simply an attempt to frame a theory about how society ought to be structured or a simple socio-political theory of justice (if at all), but also to ground it in some sort of facts, and I think the following portion from Engels’ Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith serves as evidence:
Question 4: On what do you base your community of property?
Answer: Firstly, on the mass of productive forces and means of subsistence resulting from the development of industry, agriculture, trade and colonisation, and on the possibility inherent in machinery, chemical and other resources of their infinite extension. Secondly, based on the fact that within the consciousness or feeling of every individual there exist certain irrefutable basic principles which, being the result of the whole of historical development, require no proof.
Question 5: What are such principles?
Answer: For example, every individual strives to be happy. The happiness of the individual is inseparable from the happiness of all, etc. (Marx & Engels, 1848/1888/2010, p. 37)
This is precisely where Marxism comes in (again). The issue I want to focus on is that Marxists usually ‘deconstruct’ ideologies or beliefs in order to unveil implicit values, but it seems to be that all values or value systems, in part or in whole (but mostly whole), are (socially?) constructed, and that includes Marxist values as well, which means they are all equally susceptible to deconstruction, like any other belief or ideology. Even if the descriptive portions of Rawls’ and Fraser’s theories of justice are flawed, the prescriptive portions may be coherent. Although, the issue there is that they are wholly constructed. ‘Why not accept the prescriptive parts of Rawls’ and Fraser’s theories?’ is a great question. There are even better questions, such as ‘Why accept any part of their theories?’ and ‘Whose theory should one accept? Rawls’ or Fraser’s?’ We have no particular reason to prefer the ideas of Nancy Fraser over those of Brendan Fraser. If Brahminism can be deconstructed and done away with because its values and principles are ‘socially constructed’, then we may just as well do away with the theories of Rawls, or Fraser, or Marx, or Marxists, or anyone, really. Marxism is just as much an ideology as any other.
There is one last point I’d like to draw attention to, in this section. It is quite ironic that the “Communist revolution” whose “development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas” is built on “certain irrefutable [emphasis added] basic principles” (Marx & Engels, 1848/1888/2010, pp. 26, 37). Why are Marxist principles (or the principles that Marxism appeals to) ‘irrefutable’? How does anyone wanting to be ‘happy’ (whatever that’s supposed to mean, and however that’s supposed to be achieved) logically lead to the restructuring of society to any degree? Marxists (whether the original or the modern) may feel quite pleased deconstructing and revealing the implicit values held by a society/group/person, but all the while, their own ideological values are off-limits, hidden and ‘irrefutable’ and not meant to be analyzed or deconstructed. To be fair, however, this probably doesn’t happen (most of the time) due to malice, but can be simply due to ignorance or oversight. Marx himself probably couldn’t have been less concerned about all of this. After all, “The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination” (Marx & Engels, 1848/1888/2010, p. 25). Whether that tells on his malice, or ignorance, or oversight, or all three, I’m not sure, but could it be representative of the attitudes of modern Marxists as well?
Destruction
Thus far we get the sense that there is some kind of deep tension within Marxism. This tension, from what I can tell, is the result of two fundamental contradictions (or maybe one contradiction with two aspects) that lie at the heart of social constructionism, and therefore also at the heart of modern Marxism (since I get the impression that social constructionism is more or less at the heart of modern Marxism). I will elaborate on these in this section, starting first with the last lengthy quoted passage of this very lengthy essay.
The Freudians have discovered that we exist as bundles of complexes. The Marxians have discovered that we exist as members of some economic class. In the old days it was supposed that if a thing seemed obviously true to a hundred men, then it was probably true in fact. Nowadays the Freudian will tell you to go and analyze the hundred: you will find that they all think Elizabeth [I] a great queen because they all have a mother-complex. Their thoughts are psychologically tainted at the source. And the Marxist will tell you to go and examine the economic interests of the hundred; you will find that they all think freedom is a good thing because they are all members of the bourgeoisie whose prosperity is increased by a policy of laissez-faire. Their thoughts are ‘ideologically tainted’ at the source. Now this is obviously great fun; but it has not always been noticed that there is a bill to pay for it.
There are two questions that people who say this kind of thing ought to be asked. The first is, Are all thoughts thus tainted at the source, or only some? The second is, Does the taint invalidate the tainted thought — in the sense of making it untrue — or not? If they say that all thoughts are thus tainted, then, of course, we must remind them that Freudianism and Marxism are as much systems of thought as Christian theology or philosophical idealism. The Freudian and the Marxian are in the same boat with all the rest of us, and cannot criticize us from outside. They have sawn off the branch they were sitting on. [emphasis added] If, on the other hand, they say that the taint need not invalidate their thinking, then neither need it invalidate ours. In which case they have saved their own branch, but also saved ours along with it.
The only line they can really take is to say that some thoughts are tainted and others are not — which has the advantage (if Freudians and Marxians regard it as an advantage) of being what every sane man has always believed. But if that is so, we must then ask how you find out which are tainted and which are not. …
If you try to find out which are tainted by speculating about the wishes of the thinkers, you are merely making a fool of yourself. You must first find out on purely logical grounds which of them do, in fact, break down as arguments. Afterwards, if you like, go on and discover the psychological causes of the error. In other words, you must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong. The modern method is to assume without discussion that he is wrong and then distract his attention from this (the only real issue) by busily explaining how he became so silly. [emphasis added] In the course of the last fifteen years I have found this vice so common that I have had to invent a name for it. I call it Bulverism. (Lewis, 1970, Part 3, Chapter 1)
The first contradiction concerns facts, or descriptions, or truth claims. Marx made general claims that the (ruling or dominant) ideas in a society are merely an expression of economic conditions/relations. Even if that were true by itself, he framed it in such a way (refer to the quotation in the Description section in part 1) that it seemed like he meant to say, ‘Because the dominant ideas of a society come from the ruling class, therefore they’re invalid,’ or to put it more generally, ‘Because a person’s ideas are determined by their social class/position, therefore they’re invalid/meaningless.’ Althusser was perhaps expressing the same thing, in relation to something called ‘aleatory materialism’, by saying that philosophy cannot produce universal truths, and he dismissed the possibility of philosophers having objective knowledge of the world (Lewis, 2018). Consider, also, Althusser’s concept of ideology as being basically everywhere and pervading everything. That’s very smart and all, and also a textbook example of the fallacy of Bulverism, because when Althusser says, ‘ideology is everywhere,’ one should ask, “So?” Even more to the point, if some proposition or belief being an ideology (or a product thereof) somehow dissolves its truth value, then Althusser’s own idea of ideology is worthless (since everything is ideology, no?). The problem with Althusser, and Marx, and Marxists today, is that they very conveniently claim to objectively dismiss all objective truth claims.
This comic is a personal favourite, but let me also address an objection: a friend of mine, on this issue of objective truth claims, said something along the lines of, ‘What would you say if the dude in the comic were to reply, “I’m not sure” to the question?’ Well, I would say that that would indicate skepticism, and that skepticism can be of two types: either it can mean that we can never be sure about whether or not there is absolute truth, or that we are unsure for the time being, but can figure it out at some point. In the first instance, if it is somehow really and ironically and objectively true that we can never be sure about absolute truth claims, then the first practical step would be to choose either of the options (since you can’t know anyway), and we then circle back to either the self-contradictory ‘Yes’ of the comic, or else the coherent and sensible belief in objective truth. If we can figure it out at some point in the future, I suppose we will again end up arriving at either of the two options, and, well, you can figure out the rest.
The second contradiction, as you might have guessed, is about value claims, and I have already described some of the relevant issues towards the end of the Deconstruction section, about Marxism itself being an ideology liable to ‘deconstruction’ and invalidation. Here, I will elaborate on the same points with a few examples and then add some potential solutions. These examples aren’t my personal beliefs; I’m only using them to demonstrate my point. Suppose you believe that men and women are of equal worth, and that patriarchy6 is an evil/wrong ideology that must be wiped out of society. You may or may not be right, and patriarchy also may or may not be right, but if you really believe patriarchy to be wrong, then the logically sincere starting point would be to show that men are actually not superior to women (or that they are ‘equal’), rather than ‘deconstructing’ patriarchy, or uncovering the biases of men or of certain cultures or value systems, or narrating relevant historical incidents, because, for all we know, men may actually be superior to women, and ‘deserving’ of more rights and privileges and whatever else. Or, the Brahmins might be right in their beliefs,5 and Shudras and Dalits may indeed be at the bottom of some kind of natural/social hierarchy and therefore actually be impure, or of lesser worth, etc. Or, heterosexuality might be objectively normative, and sexual beliefs/practices deviating from it might be wrong or incorrect. For each of these cases, from a neutral starting point, we don’t know whether they’re correct or incorrect, but there are possible ways to show why they might be either.
Recall my previous example about Brahminism and casteism. The whole thing may very well be utter nonsense, or could have been made up or concretized during the British era (Chakravorty, 2019) or whatever else, but since there are persons who hold these beliefs (which might be a sizeable number) and also claim a religious basis for them, the first step is to show that they are nonsense (or just incorrect) and this can be done in various ways: (1) undermine the (descriptive) assumptions that the normative beliefs are linked to, such as showing that the particular god/gods (eg. Brahma) doesn’t/don’t actually exist, or that the caste hierarchy isn’t actually commanded/ordained by Brahma, or that Brahmanism or Hinduism as a whole (if there be such things) is false, or (2) point out the is–ought gap, that even if it were fully objectively true that the caste/social hierarchy is based in Brahma, it maybe doesn’t imply that we ought to actually practice these hierarchies in daily life.
After showing why the beliefs and values are mistaken or coherent, you can go on to trace the socio-historical events leading to the beliefs and values being formed. I specifically chose a religious belief (system) for a longer example for two reasons. First, in some sense, it is easier to argue against religious norms (though hardly easier to change them in real life) because while it would be logically fallacious to say that ‘because so-and-so is (or is not) a fact, therefore so-and-so norm is wrong/incorrect,’ as I have mentioned before, many religions by themselves claim ‘oughts’ that are connected to some descriptions (such as that the norms/values are prescribed by a deity), and therefore undermining the apparently ‘descriptive facts’ can undermine the norms too. Second, religions seem less silly and make a little more sense when we see them partially as attempts to solve the is–ought problem, i.e. not simply as consisting of random floating prescriptions, but as prescriptions based in some descriptions (about the supernatural, or about human nature, etc., and this will be relevant later on, in part 3). Whether these attempts have been weak, or appreciable-yet-incomplete, or pathetic, I personally consider them at least a little more commendable than belief or thought systems that simply assume values or prescribe norms while completely overlooking the relevant issues, especially the fact–value distinction.
That, of course, is the whole problem with Marxism. If morality is merely social politics and nothing more, then Marxists are also merely social politicians, just the same as everyone else. Employing social constructionism might be great fun and enable the procedure of deconstruction and all that goes along with it, but deconstruction taken to the end leads to the destruction of the very base by which you critique and criticize beliefs. If you look through the lens of social constructionism, you can see nothing.
But you cannot go on ‘explaining away’ forever: you will find that you have explained the explanation itself away. You cannot go on ‘seeing through’ things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? It is no use trying to ‘see through’ first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see. (Lewis, 1944, Chapter 3)
Social constructionism aside, then, how can one properly criticize? Firstly, as I’ve pointed out above, you can undermine the ‘is’ itself and thereby the connected ‘ought’ if the connection is a strong one or emphasized by the person/group making the value claim (like in the case of religious claims), and this can be done by actually disproving the claim, eg. if people claim that since fetuses are not human beings, therefore they ought/need not be entitled to human rights, this can be undermined by the descriptive facts which show that human life indeed begins at conception, and so (according to their reasoning), the human rights of embryos and fetuses ought to be protected. Secondly, as I've described above, you can simply point out the is–ought gap. Both of these steps, however, will not be very effective, because at best they simply leave you with equivalent claims, both of which one can choose between, eg. one could say ‘Even if men aren’t superior to women, it doesn’t mean I ought to treat them equally, so I can do what I want!’ The third way, which is the most difficult of all, is to do the theoretical heavy lifting and somehow prove your ‘ought’, eg. all humans are of equal and actual worth and one ought to treat them so. Whether this is even possible, and whether criticism in general is possible at all, I will explore in part 3 along with some sociological speculation on how such glaring logical holes and philosophical oversights have come to be the standard of such an expansive and influential tradition as Marxism.
I think a small note is in order, before proceeding. In case it may seem like I’m unreasonably bashing Marxism alone, or defending some other belief system, let me clarify that the is–ought problem applies to…any belief or belief system, really. Brahmins and Buddhists and Byzantine Christians have as much of the onus to provide a non-arbitrary base for their value claims (or any claims) as do Marxists, or mathematicians, or mailmen, or anyone else…that is, if they care about theoretical coherence and logical consistency. This essay specifically addresses Marxism because I am under the impression that Marxists actually want to avoid gaping logical flaws and maintain consistency in their claims and theories. Then again, I could be completely wrong.
Jacques Derrida, who came up with the whole concept of deconstruction, and who may or may not have been Marxist, but whose ideas and theories have certainly been lauded and applied by many modern Marxists, apparently deeply protested logical consistency and the ‘straitjacketing constraints of logic’ (Cuff, Sharrock & Francis, 2006, p. 252). In my world, propositions or beliefs or worldviews that are ‘completely free’ from the ‘constraints of logic’ are labelled ‘nonsense’. But my world can be kept aside. If you really want to throw aside logic because it’s so much gobbledygook and only another exercise of power (or an effect thereof) and you want to be free from the burden of ensuring logical consistency, how are you any different from the man who stutters and fumbles when asked for a rational elaboration of why he believes men are superior to women? How are you any different from the woman who imposes her religious beliefs on her grandchildren, and who, on being asked why she holds to those beliefs or why her grandchildren ought to abide by them, can only get frustrated and declare, ‘Because I said so and that’s how it should be!’?
Endnotes
I say so because the thought experiment is evidently concerned with equality between all classes and members of any society, and especially, as Rawls repeatedly emphasized, with the wellbeing of the most disadvantaged members. This echoes (for me, at least) the Marxist concern for the marginalized/subaltern, and maybe some exciting theorizing could take place if the ‘original position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ were somehow synthesized with the whole field/theory of standpoint epistemology (that is, if such theorizing is worth doing in the first place)?
To learn more, you can check out the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy or this short video which illustrates and explains the ‘veil of ignorance’ very well: https://youtu.be/A8GDEaJtbq4
Of course, I don’t mean that all children everywhere, simply by virtue of existing and being children, are necessarily the most marginalized of all, but that they potentially and usually suffer most, generally.
For a quick good summary of the is–ought problem, watch this video: https://youtu.be/eT7yXG2aJdY
Please don’t fact-check me about whether or not ‘Brahmins’ are a coherent social group, or that caste-related beliefs aren’t actually a part of Brahminical beliefs, or that ‘Hinduism’ isn’t a unified religion but simply an amalgamation of various beliefs and practices that vary every 50km in India. None of this is relevant here because my attempt is simply to use an illustrative example (although I do not mind gaining historical accuracy).
Here, I only take ‘patriarchy’ to mean ‘the belief that men are (qualitatively) superior to women.’
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